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The Use of In Vitro Fertilization: Is There a Right
to Bear or Beget a Child by any Available
Medical Means?
The prodigious advancements of biomedical science in human reproduction
have brought both blessing and cursing in recent years. Many join with child-
less couples and hail the opportunity to bear a child, while others fearfully
contemplate the moral and ethical consequences that accompany the birth of
that child. In view of those consequences, laws limiting access to the new
methods of reproduction are bound to be drawn and couples are bound to
challenge them as unconstitutionally limiting their right to privacy. This
comment examines the arguments of both sides in determining whether the
right of privacy protects the use of the new methods from government regula-
tion. It presents the constitutional grounds for such arguments and considers
the various factual situations that may confront a court deciding the issue. It
ends with an evaluation of interests that might justify regulation even if the
use of the methods is protected.
I. INTRODUCTION
The term in vitro fertilization (hereinafter IVF) probably does not
mean much to most people, but the common name, test-tube baby,
does. To the naive, the latter term conjures up visions of whole ba-
bies cultured in laboratories. To the more sophisticated, either term
represents a major advance in biological science and presents oppor-
tunities to shape men's lives in ways that until now were only possi-
ble in science fiction novels. Initially, IVF provides infertile persons
with a means of having genetically related children. It also presents
opportunities for parents to select desireable characteristics for their
children, screen out genetic defects and, should the science of genet-
ics continue to advance, to genetically engineer a child's make-up.
Such notions conjure up villainous images in our minds, and raise
concern over the use of the IVF process of human fertilization. On
one side, those who see the possible consequences of IVF call for laws
to stop its use. On the other side are those who desire children but
cannot have them, and who claim the inherent right to have children
by any feasible method. Stopping IVF takes away that right.
This comment examines the claim that the United States Constitu-
tion guarantees as a fundamental right access to IVF as a means of
procreation. Consideration will first be given to the IVF process, the
need for regulation, and the constitutional bases for recognizing a
right to use IVF. Secondly, the factual situations with which a court
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may be faced are addressed. Finally, consideration is given to govern-
mental interests that may justify laws restricting access.
II. THE IVF PROCESS
IVF replaces the events of natural reproduction that take place in
the oviduct of a woman.' In natural reproduction, once an egg has
been formed in the ovary and released into the fallopian tube or ovi-
duct, it travels toward the uterus. If not intercepted and fertilized by
sperm travelling up the oviduct, the egg is discarded through men-
struation. If it is fertilized, the egg begins to divide and continues to
move through the oviduct to the uterus. There it implants in the
uterine wall, and the child begins to develop. 2
In replacing this short process, the IVF procedure requires that
physicians extract an egg from a woman's ovary at the time it is most
developed. This is done by making a small incision in the abdomen
and locating the developing egg in the ovary with a laparoscope. A
long, hollow needle is then inserted to gently draw the egg up from
the follicle.3 Once retrieved, the egg is deposited in a petri dish, in a
suitable solution, and placed in an incubator. Sperm, maintained in
another solution, are then added to the dish and within eighteen
hours a new life has begun. The zygote is transferred to a medium
for growth where cellular division begins formation of the embryo.4
The time for implantation of the developing embryo in a woman's
uterus, to achieve the greatest success in pregnancy, is yet undeter-
mined. For some, implantation has been successful at the eight-cell
embryo stage, while others have been successful with sixteen-celled
embryos. Generally, however, about forty-eight hours after the egg
has been removed, the embryo is placed into a woman's uterus via
the vagina and cervix.5 Within this short period of time between fer-
1. C. GROBSTEIN, FROM CHANCE TO PURPOSE: AN APPRAISAL OF EXTERNAL
HUMAN FERTILIZATION 14-15 (1981).
2. Id at 17-20. There are several terms that refer to different stages of the egg's
development. Technically, once the egg is fertilized, it is called a zygote. The zygote
begins growth by cellular division and is then called an oocyst. When the oocyst grows
to the point where it is ready to implant in the woman's uterus, it is called a blastocyst.
Once implanted it is called an embryo. The term embryo can also be used generically,
refering to the whole development process, which is how it will be used in this com-
ment. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
740 (1976).
3. Hormonal drugs are sometimes used to increase the production of eggs to as
many as 17 eggs in one woman. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984,
at 46, 48. This "superovulation" adds to the risks of abnormality in the children pro-
duced from these eggs, since it increases the incidence of chromosomal abnormality.
See infra note 8.
4. See generally C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 13-24.
5. Annas & Elias, In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Medicolegal As-
pects of a New Technique to Create a Family, 17 FAM. L.Q. 199, 205 (1983). It is possi-
ble to implant an embryo that has been kept under deep freeze for some time and
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tilization and implantation, attending physicians observe the em-
bryo's development to detect possible abnormalities. It is also at this
time that the greatest scientific benefit is reaped from the IVF
process.6
The primary purpose for the development and use of IVF is to pro-
vide infertile couples with a method to bear genetically, or at least
gestationally, related children, and that it has done.7 Its use is not
without risks to the child, however.8 Some scientists indicate that
the chance for abnormal offspring is three percent greater than the
risks in natural reproduction. On the other hand, some say the risk
is equal to, or only slightly greater than, natural reproduction, given
the human body's ability to discard abnormal embryos before implan-
tation.9 Nonetheless, even a small risk is critical when dealing with
human offspring, and government intervention in the use of the pro-
cess may be warranted.
Other experimental uses of IVF have arisen because of certain ad-
vances in various fields of science.' 0 The opportunity to study the re-
produce a normal child. This has occurred twice; the most recent birth occurred in
July, 1984. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1984, § 1, at 44, col. 1. The legal status of a frozen em-
bryo is the subject of a recent Australian case. See infra note 88.
6. See infra note 10 and accompanying text.
7. Given the difficulty of the procedure, the success in relieving infertility has
been fairly good. In the six years since the first IVF birth, approximately 700 children
throughout the world have been born using the technique. Another 300 were expected
by the end of 1984. Moreover, the number of people deciding to use IVF is likely to
rise given the shortage of adoptable babies and the increase of infertility among Amer-
icans. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46.
8. There are four major risks that need to be addressed. First, superovulation,
the increase of egg production in a donor woman, increases the incidence of chromo-
somal abnormality in the embryo leading to defects in the child. Second, the quality of
sperm reaching the egg: in natural reproduction the woman's body works to filter out
abnormal sperm before they reach the egg. Third, the quantity of sperm reaching the
egg: more than one sperm reaching the egg at the same time can cause embryos with
more than one set of chromosomes leading to defects in children. Finally, freezing em-
bryos for future use may lead to mutations. Protection of Human Subjects: HEW Sup-
port of Human In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Report of the Ethics
Advisory Board, 44 Fed. Reg. 35,033, 35,044 (1979).
9. Id.
10. Complete ectogenesis, the external development of a whole living organism
whose development is naturally internal, is advanced somewhat by IVF. Also, scien-
tists have manipulated cells comprising the egg in mice and frogs so that they yield
offspring genetically identical to the parent-clones. IVF procedures for retrieving
human eggs greatly enhances human cloning possibilities. See Comment, Love's Labor
Lost: Legal and Ethical Implications in Artificial Human Procreation, 58 U. DET. J.
URB. L. 459, 480-88 (1981).
Moreoever, in the field of molecular biology, the introduction of gene-altering DNA
molecules into mouse embryos resulted in a hereditary change in the genetic make-up
of the offspring. See generally C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 50-57. Now that scien-
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productive process, within the first few days of life outside the womb,
will greatly enhance the development of new methods of interven-
tion in human growth. Use of the procedure for this purpose raises
serious ethical questions.1 '
A. Who are the Users of IVF?
IVF is primarily useful to a woman, single or married, who is infer-
tile, either because her oviduct is blocked and damaged, or because
her uterus is damaged or removed.12 IVF in both cases gives her the
opportunity to have a child that is genetically related to both her and
her husband, if she is married. In the first case, the blocked oviduct
prevents conception through intercourse or by artificial insemination.
The IVF method is needed if her egg or uterus is to be used in pro-
ducing a child. In the second case the uterus' inability to receive a
fertilized egg prevents the woman from having a child. IVF here al-
lows the woman's egg to produce an embryo that could be implanted
in another woman's uterus-a surrogate mother. The child in this
case is still genetically related to the infertile woman.
The typical use of IVF has involved a legally married couple that
cannot have children because the wife suffers from one of the two
aforementioned defects.13 Here, the procedure is performed using
the egg and sperm of the couple to produce the embryo. The embryo
is then implanted either in the wife or a surrogate mother, depending
on the malady the wife suffers. However, the process is not limited
tists can alter genetic make-up, efforts are being made to focus that alteration towards
treatment of hereditary diseases. Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Pro-
spective Human Gene Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 521-22 (1983). Although not pres-
ently possible, this technique could be "useful for influencing such genetically complex
characteristics as stature, personality, or intelligence." C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at
57.
The IVF method also allows parents to influence the characteristics of a child by
screening the genes that produce the embryo. Parents could influence the child's
physical or mental capabilities by chosing sperm and egg from donors who are intelli-
gent or beautiful or possess other characteristics. At least one sperm bank in Califor-
nia offers sperm donated from Nobel prizewinners. Friedrich, A Lega, Moral, Social
Nightmare, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 54, 56. One critic of the use of this type of eugenics
has spoken rousingly against the "Nobel sperm bank." He states that a child produced
by "Nobel sperm" has only one reason for being-
he is the experiemental [sic] product of a mad scientist and misguided mother.
The most he stands to know about his biological sire is that he was a Nobel
prize-winner .... And this lamentable wunderkind, on whose shoulders
rests such a burden, never even agreed to take part in the experiment. He
will be born into it.
New Publications of Note, 1979-81 RPTR. ON H. R. L., II-A-8.
11. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
12. Leeton, Trounson & Wood, PVF and ET: What it is and How it Works, in
TEST-TUBE BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES, AND Fu-
TURE POSSIBILITIES 8 (W. Walters & P. Singer eds. 1982).
13. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 32.
1036
[Vol. 12: 1033, 1985] In Vitro Fertilization
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
to married couples, nor to the use of that couple's sperm and egg,14
nor simply to overcome infertility.15
B. The Need for Regulation
The issues raised by IVF are many, and their impact will be pro-
foundly felt in society. P. Reilly has observed that "IVF stirs up a
... deeply traumatic and indeed tragic consciousness. What is at is-
sue is human morality, the self-definition, self-conception of our own
humanity."16 The new relationships between child and parents must
be defined and so must the rights attendant to them.17 There must
be measures safeguarding the potential child, in addition to measures
14. Donor's eggs or sperm can be used instead of the couple's. There is a total of
eight possible combinations of egg and sperm, each producing a different child. Four
combinations can be put under one category of cases: those cases where a woman's ovi-
duct is blocked so conception cannot take place, but she can bear the child. The other
four combinations can be put under a second category of cases in which a wife's uterus
is removed or damaged so that she cannot bear a child though she may be able to con-
ceive.
Under the first category falls the most common rationale for using IVF. A husband
and wife are both able to produce normal eggs and sperm, but because of some defect
or damage in her oviduct the wife is unable to conceive. The child in this case is to-
tally the product of the married couple. Another rationale is provided when the hus-
band is infertile, and the wife is fertile but still unable to conceive. Here sperm from a
donor would be used to fertilize the egg. This scenario would also apply to a single
woman who was unable to conceive but wanted to bear a child. Still another situation
is found when the wife's ovaries do not produce normal eggs capable of fertilization.
The husband's sperm can be combined with a donor's egg and the embryo can be im-
planted in the wife's uterus. Finally, there is the possiblity that both the husband and
the wife are infertile but the wife wants to bear a child. Here, the procedure would
require the egg and sperm of donors. Note that the child in this situation has two sets
of parents: parents donating sperm and egg, and parents raising the child. This raises
issues in settling the legal relationship'between child and parent. See infra note 17.
Under the second category of situations the possible combinations of egg and sperm
are the same as in the first category. In this category, another woman acts as a surro-
gate to bear the child for the couple wanting it. Note also that in the final combination
of egg and sperm under this category, the child is capable of having five parents: par-
ents donating egg and sperm, parents raising the child and one parent bearing the
child. Wallis, The New Origins of Life, TIME, Sept. 10, 1984, at 46.
15. Even those who are able to have children naturally may choose to use IVF.
IVF permits early screening of genetic defects. A couple might want to select an em-
bryo with particular characteristics. They may also want to control the exact timing of
a pregnancy for career-related reasons. Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test
Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.J. 1295, 1307
(1979).
16. GENETICS AND THE LAW 397 (A. Milunsky & G. Annas, eds. 1975) (quoting
Reilly, in a discussion he had with other professors).
17. When the child is the product of the sperm and egg of a legally married
couple, with the wife bearing the child but through conception by IVF, no issue of sta-
tus or relationship is raised. However, when the egg or sperm of a donor is used, or a
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protecting those involved from possible tort liability.'8 The legality
of surrogate mother contracts must be determined, 19 and many more
issues must be settled.20
Sensing the seriousness of the implications arising from this new
method of childbirth, some scientists, philosophers,21 theologians, 22
surrogate mother is involved, the relationships of the parties to each other is undeter-
mined.
For discussion of the issues of relationship and status of the child, see In Vitro Fer-
tilization-Oversight: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and Environment of
the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 105-07 (1978)
(statement of W.J. Wadlington) (compares the legal status of an insemination by do-
nor). The issue of the child's status centers on questions of paternity or maternity. See
Eisenman, Fathers, Biological and Anonymous, and Other Legal Strangers: Determina-
tion of Parentage and Artificial Insemination by Donor Under Ohio Law, 45 OHIO ST.
L.J. 383 (1984); Comment, New Reproductive Technologies: The Legal Problem and a
Solution, 49 TENN. L. REV. 303, 328-29, (1982). One comment discusses the possible
claims of motherhood by two women, an egg donor and a surrogate mother: Comment,
Love's Labor Lost" Legal and Ethical Implications of Artificial Human Procreation, 58
U. DET. J. URB. L. 459, 472-73 (1981).
For discussion of the issue of the legal status of IVF children as it relates to that
child's inheritance rights, see Comment, Protecting Inheritance Rights of Children
Born Through In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer: Suggestions for a Legisla-
tive Approach, 27 ST. LouIs U.L.J. 901 (1983).
18. Cohen, The "Brave New Baby" and the Law: Fashioning Remedies for the Vic-
tims of In Vitro Fertilization, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 319, 328-36 (1978) (He suggests that
experimenters should be liable for willfully or negligently destroying an embryo with-
out the consent of the parents but states that present tort actions are insufficient rem-
edies. He suggests a new tort, labelled "wrongful destruction." Cohen also considers
liability for the birth of a defective child as a result of the process.).
19. Surrogate mother contracts are a means of having another woman bear a child
for a couple. The couple pays the woman for bearing the child under the obligations of
the contract. There are two major obstacles to the legality of such contracts: 1) a pub-
lic policy against "selling children" or profiting from abortion, and 2) state criminal
laws prohibiting adultery, which surrogate parenting could be called. Note, The Surro-
gate Mother Contract in Indiana, 15 IND. L. REV. 807, 808-09 (1982) (discusses public
policy, the possible legality of the contracts, remedies for breach and suggests contrac-
tual provision and possible legislation). See also Goldfarb, Two Mothers, One Baby, No
Law, 11 HUM. RTs. 27 (1983) (tries to distinguish baby selling and surrogate mother-
hood in a call for legislation to permit surrogate contracts).
Carol Crow approaches the problems of surrogate parenting from the child's per-
spective, considering the child's legitimacy, his custody, and protections for him. Crow,
The Surrogate Chil& Legal Issues and Implications for the Future, 7 J. Juv. L. 80
(1983).
20. See Brahams, The Legal and Social Problems of In Vitro Fertilization: Why
Parliament Must Legislate, (Pts. 1 & 2), 133 NEw L.J. 859, 881 (1983) (raises issues in-
volving cryostorage or deep freezing of embryos, regulating the medical procedure and
doctor's considerations, licensing clinics, limited experimentation on embryos and re-
cording statistical data and follow-up data for research). Other prominent issues that
will enter the policymaking process are the ethical problems IVF creates. See infra
notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
21. Kass, Babies by Means of In Vitro Fertilization: Unethical Experiments on the
Unborn?, 285 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1174, 1179 (1971) (After considering the pitfalls of
continued use of IVF, Kass calls for broad public deliberation and action concerning
IVF and condemns inaction. He suggests the questions raised are too important to
leave in the hands of physicians and experimenters.).
22. See Ramsey, Shall We "Reproduce"? I. The Medical Ethics of In Vitro Fertili-
zation, 220 J. A.M.A. 1346 (1972) (Ramsey is a Doctor of Theology and Professor of
1038
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and lawyers23 have called for strict government regulation. Others
abhor government intrusion into reproductive decisions and free sci-
entific inquiries.24 Despite the discussion of the need for regulation,
few laws have been passed that address these issues.25
Nevertheless, the first consideration in forming any law is its con-
stitutionality. Since many of the regulations to be proposed will limit
access to IVF, challenges that such laws impinge on the right to pro-
create and the right of privacy are imminent. One Illinois couple has
Religion at Princeton University). Dr. Ramsey's statement is strong. IVF "constitutes
unethical medical experimentation on possible future human beings, and therefore it
is subject to absolute moral prohibition." Id. at 1346.
See also Smith, Intrusions of a Parvenu: Science, Religion, and the New Biology, 3
PACE L. REV. 63, 74-80 (1982) (though in most cases churches have not taken a stand
on IVF, the author considers various religions' probable responses to the new
techniques).
23. In Vitro Fertilization-Oversight" Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health
and Environment of the Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 105-07 (1978) (statements of W.J. Wadlington, LL.B., James Madison Professor of
Law, University of Virginia Law School) (both suggest that the present law in the ar-
eas of artificial insemination and IVF is sparse, the need for law is apparent, and legis-
lation should be enacted before the use of IVF increases.
But note that the majority of laypersons, according to Gallup and Harris polls, favor
the use of IVF. That majority, however, reflected they would prefer IVF banned until
its safety for mother and child was proven. Report of the Ethics Advisory Board,
supra note 8, at 35,053. Public opinion may have changed since these polls, as in-
creased discussion of the ethical issues raised by IVF has become more widespread.
For further discussion of the issues raised by IVF, see THE NEW GENETICS AND THE
FUTURE OF MAN (M. Hamilton ed. 1972) (presents points of view from all fields on the
issues of new beginnings in life and genetic therapy).
24. Joseph Fletcher, a renowned theologian and philosopher, suggests it is folly to
restrict the use of a medical procedure that will ultimately benefit people. And if
there are bad uses, they can be prohibited. Fletcher, New Beginnings in Life: A Theo-
logian's Response, in THE NEW GENETICS AND THE FUTURE OF MAN 78 (M. Hamilton
ed. 1972).
R.G. Edwards, the man who helped produce the world's first test-tube baby, defends
the use of IVF as therapeutic to infertile people. Edwards, Fertilization of Human
Eggs in Vitro: Morals, Ethics and the Law, 49 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 3 (1974).
25. Some commentators suggest that the legal problems connected with the artifi-
cial insemination procedure must be clarified before IVF regulation can take place.
Oakley, Test Tube Babies: Proposals for Legal Regulation of New Methods of Human
Conception and Prenatal Developmen 8 FAM. L.Q. 385, 390-93 (1974).
Most states have passed laws concerning research on fetuses but few deal with the
IVF procedure. See Flannery, supra note 15, at 1299-1300; Note, In Vitro Fertilizatio:
Hope for Childless Couples Breeds Legal Exposure for Physicians, 17 U. RICH. L. REV.
311, 323-28 (1983) (in addition to discussing the laws relating to IVF, the article empha-
sizes the effect such laws have in deterring doctors from performing IVF, thus denying
couples access to the procedure).
For further discussion of doctors' liability and deterring performance of IVF, see
Bernholz & Herman, Legal Implications of Human In Vitro Fertilization for the Prac-
ticing Physician in North Carolina, 6 CAMPBELL L. REV. 5 (1984).
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already tried to challenge a law that placed custodial responsibility
for the embryo on the doctor.26 This law had the effect of discourag-
ing doctors from performing the IVF procedure.27 The case was dis-
missed as nonjusticiable.28 Future courts, however, will have to
determine whether one has the right of access to IVF under the
rights of privacy. In doing so, a court ultimately determines the level
of scrutiny state laws will bear. If the right of privacy does include
access to IVF, then state laws limiting it will be strictly scrutinized,
and can only be justified by compelling state interests.29 If not, then
states need only have a rational basis for the law. The remainder of
this comment explores the considerations future courts must make in
determining the right to use IVF.
III. THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY AS A BASIS FOR THE FUNDAMENTAL
RIGHT TO USE IVF IN REPRODUCTION
A. The Procreation Case
The Supreme Court case of Skinner v. Oklahoma3O was the first to
recognize a right to procreate. The case involved a recidivist statute
that authorized the sterilization of criminals convicted two or more
times for committing a felony of moral turpitude. The Court stated
that the right of procreation was one of man's basic civil rights, and
because of that, it would view the state law with strict scrutiny. The
law was held unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.3 ' Though the
26. Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157 (N.D. Ill. 1983).
27. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-26(7) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) provides:
Any person who intentionally causes the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm outside the body of a living human female shall, with regard to
the human being created thereby produced, be deemed to have the care and
custody of a child for the purposes of Section 4 of the Act to Prevent and Pun-
ish Wrongs to Children, approved May 17, 1877, as amended, [Ill. Ann. Stat.
ch. 23, § 2354 (1981)] except that nothing in that [s]ection shall be construed to
attach any penalty to participation in the performance of a lawful pregnancy
termination.
The Act to Prevent Wrongs to Children, ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 23, § 2354 (Smith-Hurd
1968), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person having the care or custody of any child,
willfully to cause or permit the life of such child to be endangered, or the
health of such child to be injured, or willfully cause or permit such child to be
placed in such a situation that its life or health may be endangered.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 81-22(2)(8) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1983) defines "human being" as
"mean[ing] the individual from fertilization until death."
28. 556 F. Supp. at 162-64 (there was no case or controversy as the prosecutor
agreed not to prosecute and the case was for declaratory and injunctive relief. Fur-
ther, both the defendants and prosecutor interpreted the statute so as not to prohibit
access to IVF).
29. See infra notes 98-100 and accompanying text.
30. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
31. 1I at 541-42.
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Court recognized the right of procreation, it did little to define its
scope. Moreover, the Court's later cases reasserting the right to pro-
create, and bringing it under the auspices of the right of privacy,32 do
not deal with the limits of government restrictions on reproduction.
The basis of the court's recognition of the right to procreate as fun-
damental lies in the need to perpetuate humankind.33 If government
were allowed to routinely strip people of their reproductive capabili-
ties, it could threaten the existence of a race or of mankind. Those
who desire that the use of IVF be protected as part of their right to
procreate could argue that this rationale applies to the process. IVF
fulfills that which some lack in procreative capabilities.
It is by no means clear, however, that Skinner should be read so
broadly as to encompass access to a medical procedure as an alterna-
tive to intercourse. The logic of Skinner, that justified protecting a
man from sterilization, does not easily extend to justify protecting an
infertile couple's use of a medical procedure at the same level. Fur-
ther justification is required. One could look to the nature of procre-
ation to find that justification.
Procreation is a complex activity that involves every aspect of re-
production: genetic make-up and conception, gestation and labor, and
childrearing.3 4 These factors all contribute to one's ability to bring a
child into existence. The first two are requirements for procreation;
the third is an influential factor in most cases. Until recently, if one
were infertile, the possibility of procreating was nil. There was no
way an infertile person, man or woman, could contribute to conceiv-
ing a child. Likewise, if a couple could conceive, the inability of the
woman to bear a child would preclude reproduction. Finally, even
though a couple has the physical capacity to have a child, they may
lack the mental, financial or social capacity to desire a child. Taken
as a whole, the combination of all these factors produces a very per-
32. In Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973), the Court stated that past decisions
clearly indicate "that the right [of privacy] has some extension to activities relating to
marriage, .. . [and] procreation .... "
33. 316 U.S. at 536, 541. Note, however, that recognition of the need to perpetuate
humankind may become a less persuasive rationale for protecting procreative rights as
overpopulation becomes more of a community concern. The World Food Conference
in Rome in 1974, called on all governments and people everywhere "to support ...
rational population policies ensuring to couples the right to determine the number and
spacing of births, freely and responsibly, in accordance with national needs within the
context of an over-all development strategy." S. ISAACS, POPULATION LAW AND POLICY
354 (1981).
34. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and The Control of Conception, Pregnancy,
and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 408 (1983).
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sonal and powerful experience for couples.35 This is the experience of
natural reproduction, and a couple's interest in it is paramount to any
but the most compelling government interest.36 It is what the right
of privacy currently protects as to procreation.
IVF, however, makes procreation possible for those who lack one
of the necessary factors of reproduction. Thus, in determining
whether constitutional protections extend to a couple's use of IVF,
one must ask if the absence of any of those factors lessens a person's
interest in procreation. If it does, then the justifications for protect-
ing the natural process of procreation will not justify protecting an
unnatural process at the same level.
The case for finding that an infertile couple's interest in reproduc-
ing is no less than a fertile couple's is persuasive. John Robertson
suggests that each aspect of reproduction-conception, gestation, and
rearing-has personal value and meaning independently of the
others.3 7 He maintains that the value of each aspect by itself is
enough to extend the right of procreation to cover reproduction by
"any means or technique."38 Thus, a couple or person that had the
desire to rear a child, but who could not contribute to conceiving or
gestating the child, has a right to procreate. For government to deny
the means of doing so infringes on that right.
This argument, though strong, is not totally convincing. Certainly
one attaches meaning or value to each aspect of reproduction. How-
ever, it is the sum of those values that equals the whole of the natu-
ral reproductive experience. To take away one component, and its
value, logically lessens the significance of the reproductive experi-
ence. The value of the child is the same as any other human being as
a result of the combination of all three factors. However, the child's
value to a couple contributing only one component is less than the
value to a couple contributing all three. Though a couple resorting to
IVF may not feel less attached to the resulting child, it is not impossi-
ble to imagine a father who loves a son born from the egg of his wife
and his sperm more than a son born from the egg of his wife and the
35. Children ... provide a deeply gratifying link to the human community
and to the future. Decisions about how we will use our reproductive powers
are decisions about our future and about our own contribution to the future of
the human community, about how one's life is to count, and how far its influ-
ence is to extend.
Id at 409 n.12 (quoting Dyck, Population Policies and Ethical Acceptability in NA-
TIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 2 RAPID POPULATION GROWTH: CONSEQUENCES AND
POLICY IMPLICATIONS 618, 625-29 (1971)).
36. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (stating that the marriage
relationship clearly deserves the utmost protection of the fundamental constitutional
guarantees forming the right of privacy).
37. See Robertson, supra note 34, at 408-10.
38. Id. at 420.
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sperm of another man.39 Furthermore, though a couple finds fulfill-
ment and meaning in rearing a child not of their own seed and labor,
the meaning is less significant than when they join in every aspect of
reproduction,40 and their claim to that child is only made possible
through a series of contracts. 41
It is the fact that a couple joins to reproduce their unique genes,
biological traits, and social character in a child that makes procrea-
tion so deeply personal that it should receive utmost protection from
governmental intrusion. Reproduction by IVF, at least where one of
the three components of reproduction is missing, is not as deeply per-
sonal and therefore does not require the protections of the funda-
mental right to procreate. Government restrictions on the use of IVF
invade lesser interests and should require lesser justifications.
B. The Contraception and Abortion Cases Arguably Provide
Rationale for Extending Fundamental Protection to the
Use of IVF
Those who claim a right to use IVF in procreating suggest that the
39. There could be other reasons for which the father would not love the son born
of another man's sperm. In natural reproduction, the fact that the boy's birth repre-
sents the wife's intimacy with another man may be the cause of his lack of love.
40. This reasoning explains why a foster parent's interest in raising a child is not
as great as the natural parents'. Government interference with the former relationship
thus requires a lesser government interest to justify the interference.
[T]he importance of the familial relationship, to the individuals involved and
to the society, stems from the emotional attachments that derive from the in-
timacy of daily association, and from the role it plays in "promot[ing] a way of
life" through the instruction of children . . . as well as from the fact of a
blood relationship. No one would seriously dispute that a deeply loving and
interdependent relationship between an adult and a child in his or her care
may exist even in the absence of a blood relationship. At least where a child
has been placed in foster care as an infant, has never known his natural par-
ents, and has remained continuously for several years in the care of the same
foster parents, it is natural that the foster family should hold the same place
in the emotional life of the foster child, and fulfill the same socializing func-
tions, as a natural family.. . . But there are also important distinctions be-
tween the foster family and the natural family.. . . First, unlike the earlier
cases recognizing a right to family privacy, the State here seeks to interfere,
not with a relationship having its origins entirely apart from the power of the
State, but rather with a foster family which has its source in state law and
contractual arrangements.
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality and Reform, 431 U.S. 816, 844-45
(1977) (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
41. A couple using IVF and requiring the egg or sperm of a donor must reach an
agreement with him or her for the use of it. Also, if the seed is obtained from a stor-
age bank, the donor may be required to relinquish whatever rights he or she may have
to the child produced therefrom. Finally, if a surrogate mother is used, she and the
couple must agree as to her services. See infra notes 55-56.
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Court's decisions concerning contraception, abortion and childrearing
protect a measure of autonomy for bringing children into the world.
That autonomy, arguably, should include the decision to use IVF.
One of the first cases to recognize the right of privacy was Gris-
wold v. Connecticut.42 The Court there struck down laws forbidding
the use of contraceptives by married couples. After stating that the
right of privacy was to be found in the "penumbras" of the Bill of
Rights,43 the Court held that the Connecticut laws unnecessarily and
broadly encroached upon an area covered by the right.44 That area
seemed to encompass the decisions made in the intimacy of a mar-
riage relationship.45
Despite the language in Griswold, the Court in Eisenstadt v.
Baird46 and Roe v. Wade47 extended the right of privacy to cover de-
cisions to use contraceptives and abortions by unmarried persons. In
Eisenstadt, the Court recognized that Griswold dealt with the marital
relationship, but stated that the right of privacy, at least concerning
contraception, could not be limited to married couples.
[T]he marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of its
own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual
and emotional makeup. If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right
of the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmen-
tal intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a decision to bear or be-
get a child.
4 8
The Roe opinion included within the right of privacy abortion deci-
sions in the first trimester of pregnancy. However, that right was not
unqualified. The interest an individual has in the right "must be con-
sidered against important state interests in regulation."4 9 The Court
held that, since the rights of privacy are fundamental rights, only
"compelling state interests" would justify regulations limiting that
right.5o
In Carey v. Population Services International,51 the Court seems
to bring individual autonomy to a peak concerning childbearing
decisions.
42. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
43. I& at 484.
44. 1& at 485.
45. "Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring,
and intimate to the degree of being sacred." Id, at 486. See also Comment, On Privacy:
Constitutional Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 670, 672 (1973).
46. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (the Court found unconstitutional a law forbidding the use
of contraceptives by singles).
47. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the Court invalidated a law making abortion illegal).
48. 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
49. 410 U.S. at 154.
50. Id, at 155.
51. 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (the Court invalidated a law making it a crime to distribute
contraceptives to minors at all, and allowing adults access to them only from licensed
physicians).
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The decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of
this cluster of constitutionally protected choices. That decision holds a partic-
ularly important place in the history of the right of privacy, a right first ex-
plicitly recognized in an opinion holding unconstitutional a statute prohibiting
the use of contraceptives. . . and most prominently vindicated in recent years
in the context of contraception... and abortion .... 52
[T]he Constitution protects individual decisions in matters of childbearing
from unjustified intrusion by the state.5 3
Relying on these cases, proponents of IVF argue that the decision
to use IVF is essentially a childbearing decision; whether to bear or
beget a child and the means of having the child is irrelevant. How-
ever, the language of the Court is limited by the facts of the case
before it. At the time of the decision the only means of conception
was through intercourse; if other alternatives like artificial insemina-
tion did exist, they were not brought to the attention of the Court.
Thus, the only decisions concerning whether or not to bear a child
involved the act of intercourse. It is plausible that Eisenstadt and Ca-
rey can be read to concern only government interference with the
uniquely private act of intercourse between two people. In Carey, the
Court states that "in a field that by definition concerns the most inti-
mate of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to ac-
complish or prevent conception are among the most private and
sensitive."54 Thus, a court could conclude that the protection of au-
tonomy, afforded by the right to privacy in childbearing decisions,
only extends to decisions in natural reproduction, not in reproduction
by unnatural, medical means.
Furthermore, the IVF procedure diminishes the privacy surround-
ing the circumstances of conception. It removes the decision of
whether or not to conceive from the privacy of a couple's bedroom to
the openness of a laboratory. Through whatever contracts are neces-
sary, donors are required to relinquish rights to the child that is of
their seed.55 Furthermore, surrogate mothers may be required to re-
52. Md at 685 (citations omitted).
53. Md at 687.
54. Id at 685. Indeed, Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion to the plurality
decision, would even limit the holding further.
The Court apparently would subject all state regulations affecting adult sex-
ual relations to the strictest standard of judicial review .... In my view, the
extraordinary protection the Court would give to all personal- decisions in
matters of sex is neither required by the Constitution nor supported by our
prior decisions.
Id at 703 (Powell, J., concurring).
55. It has been recognized that donors of semen have rights to the children they
take part in producing. C.M. v. C.C., 152 N.J. Super. 160, 377 A.2d 821 (1977). Also,
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linquish their rights to the children they bear.S6 Regardless of the
fact that no donor or surrogate may be used, the procedure involves
doctors and assistants who must make vital decisions about an IVF
birth.s7
In sum, a court must decide what it wishes to protect against gov-
ernmental intrusion: the right of an individual to have a child by any
available medical means, or the right not to have the state dictate the
consequences of intercourse. To answer that an individual has a right
to bear a child by any means possible requires a substantial expan-
sion of current constitutional protections. But such an expansion is
not inconceivable considering past decisions58 To say that the matter
is beyond constitutional protection may deny some infertile couples
and individuals their only possibility of having children. It could also
severely limit the possible benefits of scientific developments should
states restrict its use.
IV. FACTUAL SITUATIONS AFFECTING THE DECISION OF WHETHER
THE RIGHT OF PRIVACY SHOULD ALSO PROTECT ACCESS
TO IVF
The range of possible users of IVF is very broad, and since a court's
decision is limited by the facts of the case before it, the situation in
which the use of IVF arises will shape a court's decision. The marital
status of the individual may influence the decision, in addition to the
purpose for which the process is used.
A. Married Persons
The right of a married couple that is able to conceive and bear chil-
dren naturally, to procreate, is uncontroverted and fundamental.5 9
Within this traditional relationship is found the full extent of a
couple's interest in contributing every component of the reproductive
experience. It is also from this relationship that the need to perpetu-
ate mankind is met. Furthermore, the decisions made in the mar-
riage relationship, described in Griswold as being intimate to the
parents using donors in the IVF process may wish to contract with the donor requiring
him to relinquish those rights.
56. See Note, supra note 19, at 820-28.
57. As noted earlier, attending physicians must observe the developing embryo to
detect abnormalities. Should any abnormalities be found, the embryo would not be im-
planted. The doctor must make that decision. See generally L. MASTROIANNI, FERTILI-
ZATION AND EMBRYONIC DEVELOPMENT (1981).
58. Dixon, The "New" Substantive Due Process and the Democratic Ethic: A Pro-
legomenon, 1976 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 70-73, 83-88 (1976). The author concludes that the
Supreme Court in its substantive due process analysis has put itself in the forefront of
American policy making in certain areas such as the rights of privacy.
59. "Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival
of the race." Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
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point of being sacred,6 0 are those deserving the most privacy and
protection.
The IVF situation in which the constitutional issue will most likely
arise is closely akin to the situation of natural reproduction in the
marriage. Both partners are fertile, providing sperm and egg, but be-
cause of some damage or obstruction in the woman's oviduct, concep-
tion is impossible naturally. Here, the couple's interests in
procreation are identical to the couple conceiving naturally: the
genes of this couple are brought together, the wife bears the child
and they raise her. Moreover, the decision to have a baby is within
the intimacies of the marriage. The only distinction is that the con-
ception and implantation take place in the clinical laboratory involv-
ing doctors and assistants. However, the presence of medical
personnel does not reduce the couple's privacy rights since doctors
are often involved in couples' confidential decisions. Indeed, in Doe
v. Bolton,61 the Court recognized that the participation of a physician
in making an abortion decision is included in a woman's right of pri-
vacy. There is, thus, no basis for distinction other than medical aid in
conception. A court determining the rights of this couple could sim-
ply say that the rights of privacy and procreation are limited to natu-
ral reproductive decisions and do not guarantee the use of a medical
procedure. However, to deny this couple the use of IVF as a medical
aid to conception seems very much like denying the use of medical
aids in contraception, which is unconstitutional. 62 Moreover, to deny
them IVF when their interest in procreation is equal to a couple
procreating naturally would be an arbitrary and irrational rule.63
The other situations in which the claim to the use of IVF may arise
involve not only some block to conception but also the absence of a
60. See supra note 45.
61. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). The Court found that a law requiring committee approval
of an abortion decision unconstitutionally limited the "woman's right to receive medi-
cal care in accordance with her licensed physician's best judgment and the physician's
right to administer it ...... Id. at 197.
62. If the right of a woman to privacy as construed by the Court is broad
enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy by artificial means, the right by analogy is sufficiently broad to en-
compass a woman's decision to initiate pregnancy by artificial means.
Kritchevsky, The Unmarried Woman's Right to Artificial Insemination: A Call for
an Expanded Definition of Family, 4 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 28 (1981) (quoting Note,
Artificial Insemination: A Legislative Remedy, 3 W. ST. U.L. REV. 48, 55-56 (1975)
(emphasis in original)).
63. It should be noted that this conclusion applies when the couple uses IVF for
relief of infertility. The conclusion that they have a right to use it for other purposes
may not apply. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
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genetic or gestational factor. Either the husband or the wife lacks
the ability to contribute egg or sperm to the reproductive process. It
could be that both lack that ability. In addition, the wife may lack
the ability to bear a child. Regardless of the situation, some link in
the process must be filled by a party outside the marriage.
Here the Court could find, in light of the nature of procreation,
that the primary concern surrounding protection of the right to pro-
create is the production of children. The lack of any factor contribut-
ing to the ability to procreate is inconsequential to the right to have
children. Thus, denial of IVF would be a denial of the couple's abil-
ity to have a child.64 The Court might also find that the decision to
have a baby by IVF concerns only those involved in the process and
falls under the Constitution's protection of personal autonomy found
in the abortion and contraception cases.
However, for the Court to reach these conclusions would require it
to ignore significant distinctions between the IVF situations and the
natural reproduction situation. IVF couples cannot contribute in
every aspect of reproduction. Their interest in the child is logically
less than the natural model, and thus should not receive the same
level of protection.
The Court may also decide that the important ethical questions
raised by IVF are best answered through the legislative processes.65
B. Single Persons66
A single woman may want to have a child without a male partner
for a number of reasons. She may be homosexual, or she may not
have found a desired partner but wants to have a child.67 The ques-
tion of whether a single woman has the right to use IVF is similar to
her right to use artificial insemination (A.I.).68 The only difference is
64. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
66. Since IVF simply replaces that which takes place in the oviduct of a woman, it
is unlikely that a single man who is infertile because of low sperm count would go to
the expense of using IVF and a surrogate mother when other alternatives are
available, like artificial insemination and sperm concentration. Thus, most single
persons who use IVF are women. Men would use the process more for eugenic
reasons.
67. Somerville, Birth Technology, Parenting and "Deviance", 5 INT'L J.L. & PsY-
CHIATRY 123, 130 (1982).
68. Artificial insemination is the introduction of semen into a woman's uterus or
oviduct by other than natural means. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTION-
ARY 124 (1976).
Married couples use artificial insemination when the husband does not produce
enough sperm to fertilize an egg or is sterile, in which case the semen of a donor is
used. Single women would use artificial insemination if they wished to be impreg-
nated without resort to intercourse. It should also be kept in mind that a single wo-
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that with IVF the woman has no alternative means of conception;
with A.I., intercourse is always an alternative.
An infertile single person who claims the right to use IVF faces
one more hurdle than does a married couple. She must first establish
that one has a right to have children without being married.69 Then
she must establish that the right to have a child protects her use of
the medical technique required to conceive it. As to the first hurdle,
the argument supporting her constitutional claim emphasizes auton-
omy in reproductive decisions. While Skinner v. OklahomaO implied
that the right to procreate was limited to procreation within a mar-
riage,71 the Supreme Court's later cases state that matters concerning
childbirth are individual. 72 To include the right to use a medical
technique to conceive, proponents argue that medical aids are used in
the woman's decision not to conceive and there should be no differ-
ence in using medical aids to conceive when recognizing the right to
procreate for single persons.
However, reproduction is not a one person affair and the court's
recognition of personal autonomy in reproductive decisions is not
completely separate from family concerns. Says June Eichbaum, the
Court "vacillates between protection of the institution of the family
on the one hand, and the integrity of the individual on the other
hand, [this] becomes apparent in a case like [Planned Parenthood v.
Danforth]73 where these interests are contradictory."74
man would only use IVF when blockage to her uterus prevents conception by artificial
insemination or natural means.
Several articles have been written concerning a single woman's right to artificial in-
semination. See, e.g., Kern & Ridolfi, The Fourteenth Amendment's Protection of a
Woman's Right To Be a Single Parent through Artificial Insemination by Donor, 7
WOMEN's RTS. L. REP. 251 (1982); Kritchevsky, supra note 62, at 26-40.
69. Certainly other than enforcing adultery laws and statutory rape laws for wo-
men under eighteen, there is little the state can do to discourage sexual activity
between consenting, unmarried adults and to discourage single parent families. None-
theless, no constitutional provision as yet has been interpreted to protect sexual rela-
tions outside marriage and to protect single parenthood. Thus, the state may deny
approval of a method that makes single parenthood available and that uses the state's
legal mechanisms to bring it about. A challenge to such a denial by a single woman
wanting a child by IVF would present the context for the discussion of the right of a
single person to have a child.
70. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
71. Id. at 541.
72. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
73. 428 U.S. 52 (1976) (The Court struck down laws requiring spousal or, in the
case of an unmarried minor, parental consent to a woman's abortion. The woman's de-
cision was not totally autonomous because the Court balanced her interest against her
spouse's or parents'. If it were totally autonomous, no balancing would be used. Thus,
family concerns enter into the analysis.).
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The Court's vacillating concern with familial interests in the pri-
vacy rights may indicate a reluctance to expand those rights to indi-
vidual lifestyles not within societal norms, like single parent families.
The Supreme Court, without opinion, approved the decision in Doe v.
Commonwealth's Attorney for the City of Richmond,75 where the
lower court stated that the privacy protection was limited to "tres-
passes upon the privacy of the incidents of marriage, upon the sanc-
tity of the home, or upon the nurture of the family life."76 Though
the Supreme Court in Carey would seem to change this rule with the
statement that the right to bear or beget belongs to the individual, it
explicitly stated it did not deal with the rights of consenting adults to
sexual relations.77 Thus, although a single woman has the right to
decide whether or not to have a child without state intrusion, states
could still outlaw sexual intercourse outside marriage or other repro-
ductive methods outside of marriage.
However, a New Jersey court's expression of the right of privacy is
logically persuasive.
[T]he Court in Carey and Wade underscored the inherently private nature of
a person's decision to bear or beget children. It would be rather anomalous if
such a decision could be constitutionally protected while the more fundamen-
tal decision as to whether to engage in the conduct which is a necessary pre-
requisite to child-bearing could be constitutionally prohibited.7 8
Should a court find that a single woman has a fundamental right to
have a baby, she must still establish that the right protects reproduc-
tion by IVF and is not limited to intercourse.7 9 This issue is the same
as with married couples, and the same justifications apply. Though
her interest in the child is less because of her genetic or gestational
lack, denial of access to IVF when it is her only means to reproduce
may be too restrictive.8 0 Also, though her decision is not totally au-
tonomous, the right of privacy may be considered to cover any repro-
ductive decision.
C. Purposes for Which IVF is Used
As noted earlier, there are a variety of uses for IVF. Its present
74. Eichbaum, Towards an Autonomy-Based Theory of Constitutional Privacy:
Beyond the Ideology of Familial Privacy, 14 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 361, 375-76 (1979).
75. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), affd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (the district
court found that Virginia's sodomy statute did not violate homosexual's privacy rights).
76. 403 F. Supp. at 1200.
77. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694 n.17 (1977). Though the
Court's reasoning is logical, public policy should not be made solely by logical exten-
sion of present rules; public morals and a policy of discouraging sexual conduct be-
tween minors and others should be considered.
78. State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 214, 381 A.2d 333, 340 (1977) (court invalidated
fornication laws).
79. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
80. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
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use is restricted to relief of infertility, and it is this purpose that
would currently concern a couple's constitutional challenge to state
limits on IVF. However, its uses in the not too distant future, and to
some extent now, give parents the opportunity to influence a child's
characteristics. 81 Since people are often concerned with the quality of
their children, it is likely that they would use IVF to effectuate their
goals of perfection in a child.82 A court determining whether a
couple has the right to use IVF must determine if that right should
be limited to relief of infertility or if it also includes IVF's eugenic
uses.
The case against recognizing a right to use IVF for any purpose and
placing it beyond the regulatory reach of government except for com-
pelling reasons is strong. The arguments against the use of IVF for
eugenic reasons are based largely on ethical and social concerns. The
most significant arguments question the idea of granting one person
the right to make decisions that could drastically alter another indi-
vidual's life, or even the lives of a whole generation of people.83 To
allow that person the control over another's life without the consent
of the one affected violates human ethics and morals.84 Of course, an
embryo cannot consent to a genetic manipulation, but the parent can.
Those who support continued experimentation and limited govern-
ment regulation suggest that parental consent is recognized for other
procedures affecting a child; it would also suffice for IVF.85 How-
ever, genetic alterations do not just affect one child, but also that
child's children and their children and so on. It may not be wise to
let one person so affect a whole generation. "For a state to leave in
81. See supra note 10.
82. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 429-30 (1983).
83. For a general discussion on duties to future generations, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF BIoETHics 507 (1978).
84. Fletcher, Moral Problems and Ethical Issues in Prospective Human Gene
Therapy, 69 VA. L. REV. 515, 538 (1983).
85. Id. at 543. Fletcher, most known for his thoughts on situational ethics, sug-
gests parental consent for the child is sufficient if the end result of the procedure is to
make the child better off, ridding him of genetic defects. But see Carey, Informed Con-
sent by Participants: Who Participates? W7ho Consents?, in TEST-TUBE BABIES: A
GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES, AND FUTURE POSSIBILITIES 67-68
(W. Walters & W. Singer eds. 1982) (An argument against parental consent is that
human will, in consenting to experimentation, cannot be subjected to another. That is
the case when a parent is allowed to experiment with a child's life. Another argument
is that the experimentation is on the embryo or child-to-be and it is spurious to believe
his consent is given if a parent's consent is given. These arguments command prohibi-
tion of IVF.).
1051
the hands of private parties the power of radically altering the ge-
netic quality of the population would require an act of political self-
restraint of a character unknown in human history."8 6
To suggest that parental consent suffices to authorize genetic alter-
ation also ignores the rights of the developing embryo, if there are
any. In Roe v. Wade,87 the Supreme Court decided that as far as
abortion was concerned, a mother's right to decide whether or not to
continue a pregnancy outweighed any right a developing child has to
be born. With IVF, however, the parent has no personal stake in the
genetic make-up of his child. The child and his offspring are the ones
affected. A court must determine what rights an embryo would have
and at what point they apply-at what point does one become a per-
son deserving the protection of the law?8 8 The question is not easily
answered. It would require an in depth factual inquiry and moral
judgment on a court's part.
Those who oppose the use of IVF for eugenic purposes also suggest
that allowing its use for relief of infertility will eventually lead to its
use otherwise, and we will end up committing the moral violations
we desire to avoid.8 9 Allowing use of IVF in the one situation that
does not require donors will eventually lead to allowing it when do-
nors are required. At that point, genetic screening, a sort of selective
breeding, begins. Then, when technology advances to the point that
86. Kindregan, State Power Over Human Fertility and Individual Liberty, 23
HASTINGS L.J. 1401, 1413 (1972).
87. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
88. See C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 75-106; Carey, supra note 85, at 68-70; Par-
ness & Pritchard, To Be or Not to Be: Protecting the Unborn's Potentiality of Life, 51
U. CIN. L. REV. 257 (1982). Answers vary widely. Some say personhood begins at con-
ception, others say not until birth. The factors that these authors consider include
medical outlooks of life, social views of personhood and moral attitudes. Finally, some
suggest that even if an embryo has rights, those rights do not carry as much weight
when balanced against rights of adults. These poignant issues have been raised in the
case of the Rios, a Los Angeles couple who died in a plane crash, leaving an estate of
one million dollars, no will, and two frozen embryos in Australia. Australian authori-
ties have battled over what to do with the embryos: whether to destroy them or at-
tempt to implant them in an adoptive mother. The latter alternative seems to be the
route they have chosen. N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1984, § 1, at 18, col. 4. As to the rights the
embryos have to inherit the Rios' estate under probate in a Los Angeles court, the is-
sue is in the air. At last report no one had been appointed to represent the embryos'
rights. N.Y. Times, June 23, 1984, § 1, at 16, col. 1.
89. See generally C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 68-71 (the idea is that we end up
on a slippery slope). The effects of IVF are also likely to be felt in the structure and
cohesiveness of the family and society.
IT]he benefits of the new technique justify its introduction for an initial pe-
riod of trial at least, but that the problems it brings in its wake, and may bring
in the future, from the disappointment of married couples who do not achieve
parenthood to the possible dispute about such matters as surrogate mother-
hood, all betray an environment that is morally problematic.
Henley, IVF and the Human Family: Possible and Likely Consequences, in TEST-TUBE
BABIES: A GUIDE TO MORAL QUESTIONS, PRESENT TECHNIQUES, AND FUTURE POSSIBILI-
TIES 85 (W. Walters & W. Singer eds. 1982).
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genes can be altered to rid children of genetic defects, it will be used.
Finally, such manipulation will be used to alter characteristics of in-
telligence, appearance, and strength. These uses of IVF are likely to
have future consequences that we cannot foresee.90
Finally, the finding that the right of privacy not only includes pro-
creation by IVF, but the use of it to alter a child's character, may go
beyond the definition of personal rights considered in the right of pri-
vacy. On the other hand, there are several persuasive arguments for
finding that once one has the right to reproduce by IVF, its use
should not be limited to relief of infertility.
There is only one situation in which the use of IVF is purely to re-
lieve infertility. That is with a couple who can contribute sperm and
egg, and the wife is able to bear the child but because of some ob-
struction in her oviduct they cannot conceive. Every other situation
requires a donor of egg or sperm. Using IVF in these situations over-
comes a couple's infertility but there is also some eugenics involved.
A couple can choose between donors of various characteristics to in-
fluence the child's traits. Nonetheless, to limit the use of IVF to only
the one situation in which the relief of infertility is pure, denies
other infertile couples the chance to reproduce. Moreover, selecting
between donors is similar to people selecting between prospective
mates with an eye to which one would produce the best offspring.91
Secondly, parents already make decisions in raising their children
that affect the child's mental and physical capacities, and the right to
make those decisions is protected from governmental interference by
the right of privacy.92
In Ginsberg v. New York,93 the Court states:
[C]onstitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents'
claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing of their chil-
dren is basic in the structure of our society. "It is cardinal with us that the
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose pri-
mary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can
90. C. GROBSTEIN, supra note 1, at 67.
91. See Robertson, supra note 82, at 430-31.
92. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (recognizing par-
ents' right to choose to send their children to private rather than public school); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (stating parents have the right to raise children as
they wish and that included allowing a child be taught German in contravention of
state law). Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973), brings these cases under the right of
privacy.
93. 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (the Court found that a law forbidding the sale of "girlie"
magazines to children was constitutional and supported parents in their childrearing
duties).
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neither supply nor hinder."
'9 4
To restrict parents on constitutional grounds from using IVF to en-
hance their children's characteristics seems anomalous to the present
status of parental autonomy in making child rearing decisions. Those
laws that conflict with parental freedom in raising children are sub-
ject to strict scrutiny, and only the greatest public interests override
that freedom.95
Finally, the idea that the use of IVF will progressively worsen until
we violate the moral structure of our society fails to recognize the
power we have as rational persons to prohibit bad uses and promote
good uses.96 Moreover, to prohibit every use of IVF precludes any
benefits that might be derived from it. Genetic experimentation at
some point, when risks to individuals are low, ought to be used to al-
leviate the pain suffered by those with genetic disease.97
Nonetheless, should a court find that the use of IVF is included in
the right of privacy, most likely its use would be limited to relief of
infertility. This presupposition is based on the parent's lack of per-
sonal stake in the genetic make-up of the child, and the far reaching
consequences of IVF.
V. BASES FOR STATE REGULATION RESTRICTING USE OF IVF
The matters raised by IVF strike deep in the heart of human con-
science and may evoke public resistance to the IVF process. State
legislatures may decide that some restrictions on IVF are warranted,
or that outright prohibition of its use is necessary. Should those reg-
ulations interfere with one's right to use IVF, they can be constitu-
tionally challenged. This section discusses the levels of constitutional
scrutiny that can be applied to state laws and looks at the public in-
terests that justify such laws.
A. Judicial Standards of Scrutiny
The determination of which standard of review to apply in a given
case is made most often by the nature of the violated right.98 Gener-
ally, regulations concerning medical procedures receive the lowest
level of scrutiny-the "rational basis" standard.99 However, when
94. I& at 639 (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944)).
95. Id.
96. See, e.g., Edwards, Fertilization of Human Eggs in Vitro: Morals, Ethics and
the Law, 49 Q. REV. BIoLoGy 3, 15-16 (1974) (Edwards, chief developer of IVF in
humans, defends its use and even goes so far as to state there are no moral problems
posed).
97. See Fletcher, supra note 84, at 525.
98. Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 68 (1981); see also Thomas v.
Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529-30 (1945) (these cases address other issues besides the right of
privacy, but clearly state the rule of determining standards of review).
99. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321-26 (1980) (upheld congressional limits
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the right is a fundamental right, a regulation interfering with it must
be narrowly drawn to serve compelling state interests.10 0 Thus, a
court's inquiry as to the following public interests, should it find that
the right to use IVF is within the fundamental rights of privacy, is
whether they are compelling.
B. Government Interests
As discussed earlier, the most controversial concern about IVF is
its use for eugenic engineering.1 0' Should the use of IVF become
widespread, state or federal governments may decide that to leave
the decision of genetic make-up in the hands of private parties, or
even the government, is undesirable. The use of IVF for eugenic pur-
poses could be prohibited altogether. Such a regulation would clearly
be rationally related to the government's concern. But if the right to
use IVF is fundamental, determining whether such a regulation is
compelling is more difficult. The assessment would have to be
largely based on the determination that the harmful results of ge-
netic screening in the composition of a population would be greater
than the benefits of treating genetic defects and altering genetic
traits.i0 2
A second interest that may justify state regulation is the protection
of the child. Certainly, where genetic experiments on the embryo
carry the risk of mutation in the child, i03 restriction of IVF is justi-
fied under either review standard i04
Thirdly, a state may declare that the embryo from the point of con-
ception is a person, which provides the state with an interest in
on use of Medicaid funds for abortions under the rational basis test). See also Whalen
v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598 (1977) (Court upheld a statute requiring a computerized filing
of patients receiving certain drugs as an exercise of the state's police powers under the
rational basis test).
100. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977); see also Roe v. Wade
410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
101. See supra notes 81-97 and accompanying text.
102. See 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcs 315 (1978) (suggests a natural balance of
personalities is needed for stable society-the influx of intelligent and crafty people
would have to be offset by an equal influx of altruistic people to help those the crafty
people exploit).
103. See Fletcher, supra note 84, at 538-39 (fear of genetic mutation is rational
under present genetic alteration technology).
104. Government can prevent the killing of a viable fetus in the third trimester of
pregnancy because its interest in the life of a child is considered compelling at that
point. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). Logically, the interest in the life of a child
that justifies not killing it would also justify not allowing methods of birth that endan-
ger a child's life.
1055
preventing the embryo's destruction.105 A state's determination that
life begins at conception would likely be upheld since the Supreme
Court has disclaimed an ability to reach such a determination, and it
may leave it to legislatures to decide.10 6 The legislature's determina-
tion would be rational. However, should a person's fundamental
right to decide whether or not to bear or beget a child be considered
to include the use of IVF, it is unlikely that the state's interest will
be compelling. In Roe v. Wade, the same interest was not deemed
compelling until the fetus was viable.107 Thus, a couple's choice to
have a child through IVF would prevail over the interest of protect-
ing blastocysts.
Where IVF involves a single woman desiring a child, the state may
have an interest in fostering marriage and maintaining the tradi-
tional family setting. This interest articulates two concerns: 1) that it
is not in the child's best interests to have only one parent, and 2) that
the moral structure of society needs protection.108
As to the first concern, the state will attempt to protect the child
from the social reproach of being illegitimate by stopping births to
single women through IVF.109 This would support a law forbidding
the use of IVF, but it is unlikely that it would be compelling enough
to justify the law if IVF's use is fundamental. One Supreme Court
decision indicates that, if a single woman has the choice to have an
abortion, she is also protected in her right to bear an illegitimate
child.110 As to the second concern, courts have always been support-
ive of family units. One court suggests that:
The family is the basic unit of our society, the center of the personal affec-
tions that ennoble and enrich human life. It channels biological drives that
might otherwise become socially destructive; it ensures the care and education
of children in a stable environment; it establishes continuity from one genera-
tion to another; it nurtures and develops the individual initiative that distin-
guishes a free people. Since the family is the core of our society, the law seeks
105. In the process of implantation, several blastocysts are used to increase the
chance of success. Those blastocysts not used for implantation are also used for fur-
ther experimentation. If the embryo were considered a person, experimentation with-
out intent to bring that person's life to fruition would violate that person's rights.
Moreover, production of embryos without intent to implant them would violate those
rights. See Flannery, Weisman, Lipsett & Braverman, Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues
Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEO. L.J. 1295, 1323-45 (1979); see also Report of
the Ethics Advisory Board, supra note 8, at 35,045.
106. Roe v. Wade 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973). "We need not resolve the difficult ques-
tion of when life begins. When those trained in the respective disciplines of medicine,
philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any consensus, the judiciary... is not
in a position to speculate .... Id. Whether the Court would give the parents' rights
more weight than the embryo's is another thing. See supra notes 87-88 and accompa-
nying text.
107. 410 U.S. at 163.
108. See generally Kern & Ridolfi, supra note 68.
109. Id. at 268.
110. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386 (1978) (discusses the right to marry
under the right of privacy).
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to foster and preserve marriage.
1 1 1
It is argued, however, that this interest should not become a rationale
for reducing the freedom of individuals to form family relationships
of their own choosing, or for requiring all citizens to conform to one
model of the family.11 2 Thus, though this interest would be a ra-
tional reason for limiting use of IVF, it may not be compelling.
VI. CONCLUSION
Among the legal issues that are raised by this revolutionary repro-
ductive process, the most elementary is whether one has a fundamen-
tal right of access to the IVF process. The determination of this issue
establishes the constitutional standard by which every governmental
restriction of its use is measured. That determination in turn will
greatly affect the prospects of the procedure's widespread use in re-
lieving infertility and in producing genetically superior children. A
finding that the right to use IVF is not fundamental will require only
that state laws meet the rational basis test in justifying interference.
States may regulate its uses, the users, those who perform the proce-
dure and it may even ban the process altogether. A finding that it is
a fundamental right under the rights of privacy would obviate any
regulation restricting access except those passed pursuant to compel-
ling state interests.
The determination of this constitutional issue is important to those
who desire to use the process as it may be their only means of having
a child. It is important to the developers and doctors who desire that
the process be used eventually to aid those who suffer from genetic
disease. The issue is also important to all of humanity, as its use
may, in the near future, drastically affect the character of an entire
generation.
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